NORTH SEA RACE 2008 – Protest Committee Findings
PROTEST, CHECKMATE v HEARTBEAT 3 of BURNHAM
“…we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses…” (Epistle to the Hebrews, 12:1, adopted by Dorothy Sayers, the English crime-fiction writer as ‘Clouds of Witness’, the title of her 1926 detective novel in which the problem is not lack of evidence but a surfeit of it.)
The protest committee (Trevor Lewis IJ GBR, Leo Pieter Stoel IJ NED), Ewen Stamp NJ GBR) was asked to consider protests between Checkmate (NED) and Heartbeat 3 of Burnham, arising from an incident at the start of the the RORC North Sea Race off Harwich on 2nd May 2008. As it was not possible to gather the parties together in GBR, Checkmate was given the opportunity either of having the protest heard in her absence or being heard by email. She chose the latter, which was also acceptable to Heartbeat 3.
The protest committee was satisfied that Checkmate’s protest complied with rule 62.1(a), and was therefore valid. Therefore, while it also decided that Heartbeat 3’s protest was invalid because she complied neither with rule 61.1(a) or rule 61.1(a)(3), it decided to proceed with the hearing.
The procedure attempted to duplicate, over a number of days, the process of a conventional protest hearing, with statements, witnesses (including race committee witnesses) and questions by the parties and by the protest committee.
Checkmate was represented by Peter de Ridder, with a principal witness of Roeland Franssens, mainsail trimmer. Heartbeat 3 was represented by Jason Payne-James.
Evidence included three captured frames (followed belatedly by a fourth) from a video taken by a crew member of Stortemelk (NED) at the start, showing the collision, as offered by Checkmate, which also submitted her GPS plot of her positions before and after the incident in various scales. Evidence was also received from the CRO on the committee boat (who had not seen the incident itself) and three members of the race committee on the port-end race committee vessel which was under motor near the incident, two of whom had seen the incident and all of whom had seen the outcome.
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
The Starting Line
The CRO said that the line had been set on 1250, and gave positions for the committee boat and port-hand mark which plot to 1240 true. The protest committee accepts 1250 for the starting line, noting that the position of the port-end mark may not have been absolutely precise.
The Wind Direction
Race committee diagram indicates 190o, therefore (125 + 90 – 190 =) about 250 of port bias.
Checkmate’s diagram indicates 300 of port bias.
Heartbeat’s later diagram shows no bias, but also shows Heartbeat approaching the starting line on a course 300 degrees off the perpendicular from the starting line alignment, suggesting 150 of port bias.
Heartbeat’s protest form diagram indicates 200 of port bias.
Nigel Mower on Lion reports a port-end bias.
Peter Cockayne on Lion reports no bias.
The video stills show boats either starting on port or tacking to port after starting. In particular, the course of the blue-hulled boat related to the visible cranes of the container terminal support a starboard-tack heading of 1450 (and therefore a port-tack heading of 2350) , which corresponds with the race committee’s assessment of wind direction.
The protest committee believes that there was about 250 of port bias to the line, and notes that, given a long line and a short first beat, the direction of the first mark was 2200 from the middle of the starting line and 2300 from the port end. A port-end port-tack start was clearly favoured.
The wind strength
Checkmate says 5-6 knots, Heartbeat 3 says 10 kts. CRO says 8kts. The sea-state and heel of boats in the video stills point to a windspeed higher than 5-6 knots.
The protest committee believes it to have been at least 8 knots.
Tide strength and direction
Peter Cockayne on Lion – tidal stream about NE at 0.5 kts (Protest Committee interpretation – tide flowing TOWARDS NE).
CRO – tide had changed at 1015 and was running at less than 0.5 knots. – diagram shows flow to north-east.
Michael Olroyd on Lion – flowing from a direction of 50 degrees left of the wind direction (nb, his diagram shows no wind port bias).
Roeland Franssens on Checkmate – tidal current was opposed to the the startline and pushed us behind the line.
Heartbeat 3’s diagram makes the same indication.
The protest committee believes that the tide was approximately 0.5 knots flowing north-east from the direction of the first mark, and that it did not have a significant effect on the course made good of either boat in the critical period after the starting signal.
The time of the collision
Checkmate – 20 seconds after the starting signal
A handwritten note by JP-J on a faxed copy of Heartbeat 3’s diagram appears to say that the time elapsed from when Heartbeat 3 believed she started until the the contact was 30 seconds.
Roeland Franssens on Checkmate – bore away for a few seconds after the starting signal, then luffed to a straight course for 10 seconds, after which the issue with Heartbeat arose.
The protest committee believes that the collision occurred around 20 seconds after the starting signal.
The speed of the boats at the time of the collision
Checkmate estimates 5 to 6 knots. The protest committee sees no reason to believe it to be otherwise, and notes that each would have travelled 4-5 boatlengths between the starting signal and the collision.
The place of the collision
The given position of the port-end mark is not thought to be accurate enough to rely on a combination of that position and the position of the collision that can be derived from Checkmate’s GPS plot (assuming that this too can be trusted, see below).
Heartbeat 3 puts it a good boatlength to windward of the starting line. Michael Olroyd puts it to windward of the starting line. Nigel Mower says Checkmate was ‘still OCS’ at the moment of the collision. None of the above believe that Checkmate had returned from an OCS position at the starting signal, but the postion of the unanchored Lion relative to the starting line at that moment may be in doubt – it appears she may not have been on an extension of the starting line.
Checkmate’s formal protest diagram shows the collision just below the starting lane (after a prolonged period of sailing on the pre-course side). Checkmate’s sketch handed to Heartbeat shows the collision just after Checkmate had dipped back over the starting line and luffed to start, with Checkmate straddling the starting line. Checkmate’s superimposition of her assessment of the starting line on the video appears to put the collision completely behind the starting line.
The protest committee believes that the photographs tell a different story. Based on 250 of port bias, boats starting on starboard would be sailing at around 700 relative to the windward mark and 200 higher than the starting line. Port-tack starters would be sailing at around 200 relative to the windward mark and 700 higher than the starting line. The limitations of trying to represent this on a 2D picture are understood, but the protest committee concurs with the race committee’s comment that the starting line will have been more port-biased than Checkmate’s superimposition would have shown.
On that basis, Checkmate has just started at the time of the collision, and is coming from a non-OCS position, supporting her original sketch. It should be noted that, for the application of the rules, it is not relevant where the incident relative to the starting line, and the important issue is whether Checkmate had returned from an OCS position.
Checkmate’s course prior to the collision
There can be little doubt that Checkmate had been OCS. A Swan 45 (but not her sail number) was identified as being OCS from the committee boat, and Checkmate was the only Swan 45 in the start. Roeland Franssens says that on hearing the broadcast OCS signal, Checkmate bore away by 300 on the probability that Checkmate was one of the OCS boats.
Those observing from Lion believed that Checkmate was OCS at the starting signal, one of them saying that she was conspicuously OCS as if she had mistaken the line.
The protest committee judges that Checkmate went from a clear OCS position at the starting signal to the collision in less than 20 seconds.
One would have expected the truth to have been shown by Checkmate’s GPS plot. This, however, creates more questions than answers. The point of collision on that plot is identified by Checkmate, and it shows Checkmate sailing an undeviating course for 120 metres (say 394 feet) prior to the collision on a course of 1090. At 6kts, that would take around 36 seconds. So the plot does not show what is known to have happened towards the middle of that short leg, namely the 300 bear-away for the starting line followed by a luff to start on a heading of around 1450. In addition, a course of 1090 is lower than the starting line’s 1250, a difference that is more than the effect of the tide, and it is not credible to believe that Checkmate could have pursued such a disavantageous course for so long after the starting signal.
Checkmate has informed us that the GPS position is updated every two seconds, so it should have shown her pre-starting course changes. Checkmate herself points out that the collision appears to have upset the GPS in its plotting of what happened after the collision, and perhaps it made some well-meaning retrospective adjustment.
The protest committee has therefore decided that the GPS plot does not reveal reliable information about the collision.
(Prior to position 001 on the plot, the GPS does appear to be telling a credible story. Checkmate comes out of the Orwell, approaches the committee boat, then falls back, sails down the line at over 100 metres from the line, tacks, bears away and sails back down up line, tacking back at mid-line onto a course slightly higher than the line. Stortemelk was to leeward and luffed Checkmate further away from the line, to a position just before position 001, where ‘the vessels slowed with all sails flogging’ (Roeland Franssens), then bore away towards 001 with Stortemelk ‘to leeward and ahead’. (ibid). At that point Franssens saw Heartbeat on port tack but did not believe her to be a danger.)
We then find that at the starting signal, Checkmate was OCS on starboard tack and decided to bear away towards the starting line. In the process, she now became an issue for Heartbeat which was making a late close-hauled port-tack approach to the starting line to start near the port-end mark.
Checkmate asserts that Heartbeat made no attempt to alter course. Heartbeat, to the contrary, asserts that Checkmate turned towards her, causing her to need to alter course, which she said she did by luffing. Checkmate then (Heartbeat says) luffed, causing Heartbeat to try to bear away. The protest committee notes that Checkmate’s assertion that Heartbeat had no one at the bow appears to be contradicted by the photographs.
The result of the collision
The protest committee is satisfied that serious damage resulted to both boats.
SUMMARY OF FACTS FOUND
In summary, we believe that both boats behaved predictably in the circumstances prevailing before the starting signal. Checkmate bore away from an OCS position at the starting signal for as long as it took to return, and then luffed to a close-hauled course to start. Heartbeat was making a relatively long close-hauled approach to start on port-tack, and the protest committee is satisfied that she was keeping a look out. Heartbeat was unable to avoid contact despite luffing and then bearing away, and damage resulted to both boats that rendered their continuing to race unsafe.
CONCLUSIONS AND RULES
The starting signal was made at position S1-P1. At this point, Checkmate was OCS, with right of way under rule 10. Heartbeat’s course at that moment was one that would have kep her clear and astern of Checkmate. Checkmate then bore away by 300 for the starting line. Right of way now changed, since Checkmate was now required to keep clear by rule 20.1. Heartbeat gained right of way under that rule, but was not required togive room to Checkmate because she had ‘acquired right of way because of the other boat’s actions.’
At position S2-P2, Heartbeat could not sail her course and needed to take avoiding action. Checkmate was by definition not keeping clear, and broke rule 20.1.
Heartbeat luffed. Checkmate completely crossed the starting line, and reacquired right of way under rule 10. She was now required by rule 15 to give Heartbeat temporary room to keep clear. Checkmate luffed, and Heartbeat, despite trying to take avoiding action, could not avoid the collision. Checkmate therefore did not give Heartbeat the room to which she was entitled under rules 15 and 16.1.
Checkmate caused serious damage, and her penalty under rule 44.1 was to retire. (See also the Basic Principle, Sportsmanship and Rules.)
Checkmate retired, and is not to be penalized further. See ISAF Case 99, which says, ‘When a boat retires as required by rule 44.1, whether out of choice or necessity, she cannot then be penalized further.’
Heartbeat was a boat entitled to room before the collision. She tried to avoid contact when it was clear that Checkmate was not giving room, and therefore did not break rule 14.